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ABSTRACT
Peer punishment has been an important instrument in enabling so-
cial norms to emerge. However, it is usually assumed that unlim-
ited resources are available to agents to cope with the resulting en-
forcement costs. In this paper, we use a modified version of the
metanorm model [1] to investigate this, and show that it allows
norm emergence only in limited cases under bounded resources.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many have been concerned with the development of mechanisms
to ensure the emergence of social norms. In particular, researchers
from many scientific areas have considered punishment as a key
motivating element for norms to be established (e.g., [2, 7]). Here,
punishment is a monetary incentive, typically incurring an enforce-
ment cost for the punisher, but bringing a potential benefit to the
population as a whole. Work that uses punishment as a means
for social norms to emerge has assumed that agents applying such
punishment have unlimited resources, allowing them to bear the
enforcement cost. This assumption is significant in real world set-
tings in which resources are limited and require more careful ex-
ploitation. For example, sensors in wireless networks have limited
energy and thus need to optimise their use of it.
In response, this paper seeks to address such limitations by in-
tegrating the constraint of limited resources within the metanorm
model originally proposed by Axelrod [1] and adapted by Mah-
moud et al. [5, 6]. The metanorm model has been shown to be
capable of regulating distributed computational systems under var-
ious settings. This paper investigates the limitations of the static
punishment mechanism of this model under limited resource con-
straints, and makes some suggestions to resolve such issues.
2. METANORM MODEL
In Axelrod’s metanorm model [1], a population of agents play a
game in which each agent has to decide between cooperation and
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defection. Defection brings a reward for the defecting agent called
temptation, and a penalty to all other agents called hurt, but each
defector risks being observed by the other agents and punished as
a result. These other agents thus decide whether to punish agents
that were observed defecting, with a low penalty for the punisher
known as an enforcement cost, and a high penalty for the punished
agent known as a punishment cost. Agents that do not punish those
observed defecting risk being observed themselves, and potentially
incur metapunishment. Thus, each agent decides whether to meta-
punish agents observed to spare defecting agents. The strategy of
each agent in determining whether to defect and whether to punish
others is based on two different attributes, boldness (B) (encour-
aging agents to defect) and vengefulness (V) (encouraging them to
punish and metapunish others), which are distinct for each agent.
The agent population evolves through a number of iterations, with
a mechanism whereby successful behaviour (as measured by the
scoring system) tends to be replicated and unsuccessful behaviour
tends to be discarded. However, a major problem with Axelrod’s
model is due to the evolutionary approach adopted (as identified in
[3]). In consequence, this original approach was replaced with a
reinforcement learning algorithm that limits accessibility to global
information, and instead allows agents to learn from their own ex-
perience [6]. Moreover, in order to capture a key feature of com-
putational systems with structural relations between their compo-
nents such as on-line virtual communities, Axelrod’s classic model
has been adapted by introducing a topological structure [5] that de-
termines observability among agents, so that an agent’s neighbours
are the only witnesses of its interactions.
3. LIMITING RESOURCES
As mentioned above, in real world settings, agents usually have
limited resources for enforcement. Thus, once an agent i is in a
position to apply punishment to a violator agent j, the punishment
can only take place if sufficient resources exist to supplement the
enforcement cost that can result from the punishment. First, i needs
to be able to identify the amount of resources available for punish-
ment on all agents. In addition, i needs to estimate the resources
(enforcement cost) required to apply this particular punishment.
Having verified that a punishment is possible, i can then punish
j, which results in the resources of i decreasing by the relevant en-
forcement cost. This affects future decisions that i can make with
regard to punishment and metapunishment. Now, since resources
are in general renewable, we consider them to be limited only over
a particular period of time. With regard to the metanorm model,
this means that once a particular agent expends all of its resources,
it cannot apply any form of punishment or metapunishment un-
til the restriction period has passed, after which resources are re-
newed. Since the model is round based, we assume that resources
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Figure 1: impact of limited resources of 12 units on final B and V
and various neighbourhood size
are renewed every round for each agent. In what follows, we show
the effect of this new restriction on norm establishment using the
metanorm model.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The most desirable results are those with high vengefulness and
low boldness, which are referred to as norm establishment. This
is because low boldness means that agents defect rarely, and high
vengefulness means that agents are generally willing to punish an
agent that defects. Other results involving midrange or high levels
of boldness are referred to as norm collapse, since they involve a
high number of defections. Topologies are also an important com-
ponent, and have been shown to have different effects on norm es-
tablishment [5]. For the purposes of this paper, we use a simple
lattice topology for which norm establishment has been achieved
previously.
The interaction model of agents involves the following sequence
of actions. For every defection opportunity that an agent i has, all
of i’s neighbours have a chance to punish i. If a neighbour j de-
cides to spare i from punishment, then all of j’s neighbours have
the chance of metapunishing j. Assuming that every agent has 4
distinct neighbours, this means that for every single defection, 4
punishment decisions need to be taken, and if all these punishment
decisions result in sparing the defector, 4 × 4 = 16 metapunish-
ments can arise. Based on this, it is clear that agents will invest
most of their resources on punishment and metapunishment as a
result of the outcome of the first few defections, with scarce re-
sources left to regulate the behaviour of the remaining agents. This
explains the results obtained from an experiment where each agent
is provided with 12 resource units that are renewed every round,
and each agent has a neighbourhood size of 8. The results of this
experiment show that the model fails to establish the norm with the
average boldness of agents remaining very high, and reflecting a
very high rate of defection. The surprise here is that the average
vengefulness is also high, which is due to two factors. First, for
the first few occurrences of defection, sufficient resources remain
available for metapunishment. Second, resources run out quickly,
so no more enforcement costs are paid by agents to cause venge-
fulness to drop. This last factor also explains the high boldness,
with insufficient punishment taking place to deter defecting agents
by outweighing the temptation gained.
The above analysis suggests that the number of neighbours of
each agent plays a major role in the obtained results. Therefore, a
further set of experiments were conducted in which neighbourhood
size was varied. The results reported in Figure 1 are for a lattice
topology with neighbourhood size varying between 2 and 9, and a
limited resource of 12 units. Each point on the graph represents an
average of 1, 000 runs with a particular neighbourhood size. We
can see that with limited resources of 12 units, we establish the
norm up to a neighbourhood size of 6, but not after that. A similar
outcome is found using other amounts of limited resources. For
example, with limited resources of 6 units, norm establishment is
observed up to a neighbourhood size of 3, and up to a neighbour-
hood size of 4 with limited resources of 8 units.
5. DISCUSSION
This paper has studied the effect of integrating a limited resource
constraint within the well established metanorm model. The ex-
perimental results show that the static punishment mechanism of
the metanorm model fails to establish the norm, with a clear re-
lationship between the available resources and the neighbourhood
size of the network topology. This is mainly due to the lack of
consideration of available resources when a punishment is applied,
which suggests that an adaptive punishment mechanism may be
better suited to achieving norm establishment. Such adaptive pun-
ishment has been proposed in previous work [4], in which agents
calculate an appropriate punishment to deter a defector from future
violations, based on past behaviour of the defector. Initial experi-
mental results show that norm establishment is improved with such
a mechanism. However, norm establishment is still limited, since
the proposed adaptive punishment mechanism does not consider
the amount of resources available to the agent when applying the
punishment.
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